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By the year 2000, the U nited States will have a projected 40,000 metric 
tons of spent nuclear fuel stored and awaiting disposal at some seventy 
sites. By 2035, after all existing nuclear plants have completed forty years 
of operation, there will be approximately 85,000 metric tons (Technical Re­
view Board, 1991). The amount of spent fuel needing disposal will continue 
to grow with the relicensing of existing nuclear plants and the possible con­
struction of new facilities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been 
under intense pressure from Congress and the nuclear industry to dispose 
of this accumulating volume of high-level waste since the passage of the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982 and its amendment in 1987, by which 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, was selected as the only candidate site for the 
nation's first nuclear waste repository. The lack of a suitable solution to the 
waste problem is widely viewed as an obstacle to further development of 
nuclear pow!:lr and a threat to the continued operation of existing reactors, 
besides being a safety hazard in its own right. 
Yet, to this time, the DOE program has been stymied by overwhelming 
political opposition, fueled by perceptions of the public that the risks are 
immense (Flynn et al., 1990; Kasperson, 1990; Kunreuther, Desvousges, and 
Slavic, 1988; Nealey and Hebert, 1983; and this volume). These perceptions 
stand in stark contrast to the prevailing view of the technical community, 
which believes that nuclear wastes can be disposed of safely, in deep un,der­
ground isola!ion. Officials from DOE, the nuclear industry, and technical 
experts are profoundly puzzled, frustrated, and disturbed by the public and 
political opposition, which many of them believe is based upon irrationality 
and ignorance (see Table 3-1). 
A number of important events ·during the past several years und�rscore 
the seriousness of this problem. 
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Table 3-1 Some Viewpoints of Experts Regarding Public Perceptions of the Risks from 
Nuclear Waste Disposal 
"Several years ago ... I talked with Sir John Hill, ... chairman of the United Kingdom's 
Atomic Energy Authority. 'I've never come across any industry where the public percep­
tion of the problems is so totally different from the problems as seen by those of us in the 
industry : .. ,' Hill told me. In Hill's view, the problem of radioactive waste disposal was, 
in a technic.al sense, comparatively easy" (Carter, 1987:9). 
"Nuclear wastes can be sequestered with essentially no chance of any member of the pub­
lic receiving a non-stochastic dose of radiation .... Why is the public's perception of the 
nuclear waste issue at such odds with the experts' perception?" (Weinberg, 1_989:1-2). 
"The fourth major reason for public misunderstanding of nuclear power is a grossly unjus­
tified fear of the hazards from radioactive waste .... Often called an 'unsolved problem,' 
many consider it to be the Achilles' heel of nuclear power. Seven states now have laws 
prohibiting construction of nuclear power plants until the waste disposal issue is settled. 
On the other hand there is general agreement among those scientists involved with waste 
management that radioactive waste disposal is a rather trivial technical problem" (Cohen, 
1983:119). 
"It is possible to estimate the risk [of a high-level nuclear waste repository) if the material 
is buried as planned. It turns out it is ridiculously low .... The risk is as negligible as it is 
possible to imagine, yet the clamor about the subject has paralyzed the decision-making 
authorities, and there is still no consensus solution. It is embarrassingly easy to solve the 
technical problems, yet impossible to solve the political ones" (Lewis, 1990:245-46). 
1. Official opposition by the state of Nevada has increased substantially.
In June 1989, the Nevada legislature passed Assembly Bill 222, making it
unlawful for any person or governmental entity to store high-level radio­
active waste in the state. The Nevada attorney general subsequently issued
an opinion that the Yucca Mountain site had been effectively vetoed under
a provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The governor instructed state
agencies to disregard DOE'S applications for environmental permits neces­
sary to investigate the site. The state and DOE initiated federal lawsuits over
continuation of the program and issuance of the permits needed for on-site
studies. In September 1990, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the state had acted improperly and ordered Nevada officials to issue the
permits.
2. In November 1989, the DOE, admitting dissatisfaction with its earlier as-
sessments of the Yucca Mountain site, announced that it would essentially 
start over with, "for the first time," an integrated, responsible plan. This plan 
would subject technical studies to close outside scrutiny to ensure that de-
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66 The Context of Public Concern 
cisions about Yucca Mountain wouid be made "solely on the basis of solid 
scientific evidence" (Moore, 1989).
3. In July 1990, the National Research Council's Board on Radioactive
Waste Management issued a strong criticism of the DOE program, charging 
that DOE's insistence on doi�g everything right the first time .has misled the 
public by promising unattainable levels of safety under a rigid schedule that 
is "unrealistic, given the inherent uncertainties of this unprecedented under­
taking," and thus vulnerable to" 'show stopping' problems and delays that 
could lead to a further deterioration of public and scientific trust" (National 
Research Council, 1990:1). The board recommended, instead, a more flexible 
approach, permitting design and engineering changes as new information 
becomes available during repository construction and operation. 
Perceptions of risk from radiation, nuclear power, and nuclear waste play 
a pivotal role in this story and need .to be thoroughly understood if we are 
to make any progress in resolving the current impasse. Although we already 
know a good deal about perceptions in this domain (Slovic, 1990), most of 
our knowledge comes from rather general questions (e.g., "How great is the 
risk of a nuclear waste repository compared with the risks of X, Y, and Z?"). 
With some notable exceptions (Erikson, 1990; Lifton, 1967; Weart, 1988),
there have been few attempts to penetrate the surface veneer of nuclear fear 
and provide insight into the nature and pervasiveness of people's concerns, 
the origins of these concerns, the emotions that underlie them, their legiti­
macy, and their likely stability. Analysis of the intense concerns associated 
with a nuclear waste repository is also important, we believe, for under­
standing the role that perceived risk plays in the opposition to many other 
unwanted facilities such as chemical-waste landfills and incinerators. 
Attitude, Perception, and Opinion Surveys 
There have been a number of surveys conducted recently to assess public at­
titudes, perceptions, and opinions regarding the management of high-level 
radioactive wastes. We shall focus here on the results from a series of surveys 
we conducted in 1988 and 1989 (Flynn et al., 1990). 
Details of implementing these surveys are reported in Table 3-2. More than 
3300 respondents were questioned by telephone with regard to their per­
ceptions of the risks and benefits associated with a nuclear waste repository, 
their support or opposition for the DOE repository program, their trust in the 
ability of DOE to manage the program, and their views on a variety of other 
issues pertaining to radioactive waste disposal. In addition to a national 
survey, data were collected from three other populations of special interest: 
Table 3-2 Survey Details 
Survey and Location 
Phoenix 
National 
Southern California 
Nevada 
Statewide 
Nye County 
Lincoln County 
Esmeralda County 
Nevada Total 
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Dates Sample Size Response Rate(%) 
4/,1�/8/88 802 72 
10/21-12/7/89 825 77 
12/6/89-1/1/90 801 77 
9/25-10/15/89 500 74 
9/25-10/15/89 204 74 
9/25-10/15/89 101 84 
9/25-10/15/89 101 77 
9/25-10/15/89 906 77 
residents of Nevada, the state selected as the site for the proposed national 
repository, and residents of southern California and Phoenix, Arizona, the 
two major sources of visitors to Nevada. The Phoenix survey was less exten­
sive than the others and will be discussed in the next section�spondents 
were selected by means of a random digit dialing procedure. When tele­
phone contact was made with a household, the interviewer asked to speak 
to the person eighteen years or older who had the most recent birthday (to 
ensure random selection of respondents within each household). Response 
rates were high (72 to 84 percent) in each of the surveys� 
When asked to indicate the closest distance they would be willing to live 
from each of ten facilities, the median distance from an underground nuclear 
waste repository was 200 miles in the national, Nevada,1 and southern Cali­
fornia surveys, twice the distance from the next most undesirable facility, a 
chemical waste landfill, and three to eight times the distances from oil refin­
eries, nuclear power plants, and pesticide manufacturing plants. In response 
to the statement "Highway and rail accidents will occur in transporting the 
wastes to the repository site," the percentage of respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed was 77.4 percent in Nevada, 69.2 percent in California, and 
71.6 percent nationally. Similar expectations of problems were expressed 
with regard to future earthquake or volcanic activity at the site, contami� 
nation of underground water supplies, and accidents while handling the 
material during burial operations. 
· When asked whether a state that does- not produce high-level nuclear
wastes should serve as a site for a nuclear waste repository, 67.9 percent 
of the southern California and 76.0 percent of the national respondents an­
swered 'no' (the question �as not asked in Nevada). A majo�ity of those 
polled in the southern California and national surveys judged a , single 
national repository to be the least fair of five disposal options (including 
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storage at each nuclear plant, in each state, and in each of several regions, 
and dual repositories in the East and West). 
Strong distrust of the DOE was evident from the responses to questions 
such as "The U.S. Department of Energy can be trusted to provide prompt 
and full disclosure of any a�cidents or serious problems with their nuclear 
waste management programs." In southern California, 67.5 percent either 
somewhat or strongly disagreed with this statement. The corresponding rate 
of disagreement in the national survey was 68.1 percent. 
Nevadans were asked whether or not they would vote in favor of a re­
pository at Yucca Mountain; 69.4 percent said they would vote against it, 
compared to 14.4. percent who would vote for _it. About 68 percent of the 
Nevadans surveyed said they agreed strongly with the statement "The state 
of Nevada should do all it can to stop the repository." Another 12.5 percent 
agreed somewhat with this statement; only 16.0 percent disagreed. When 
asked whether or not they favored Assembly Bill 222, which was passed in 
1989 and made it illegal to dispose of high-level nuclear waste in Nevada, 
74 percent were in favor and ·18.4 percent opposed the bill. Finally, 73.6 
percent of Nevadans said that the state should continue to do all it can to 
oppose the repository even if that means turning down benefits that may be 
offered by the federal government; 19.6 percent said the state should stop 
fighting and make a deal. 
Follow-up surveys of Nevada residents in October 1990 and March 1991 
suggest that opposition and distrust have continued to rise (Flynn, Mertz, 
and Slavic, 1991). The percentage of Nevadans who would vote against a 
repository at Yucca Mountain increased from 69.4 percent to 80.2 percent: 
In response to a request to indicate "how much you trust each of the follow­
ing to do what is right with regard to a nuclear waste repository at Yucca 
Mountain," the governor of Nevada topped the list of officials, agencies, and 
institutions. DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the U.S. 
Congress were the least trusted entities (see Figure 3-1). Strong increases in 
trust were evident for the president, the governor of Nevada, and the Nevada 
state legislature.2 In contrast, trust in DOE and NRC declined between 1989 
and 1991. l--- Measures of trust in DOE, perceived risk, and opposition to a repository
at Yucca Mountain were highly interrelated. Table 3-3 illustrates the link 
between trust in DOE to "provide full and prompt disclosure of any acci­
dents or serious problems with a repository program" and perception of 
risk from highway or rail accidents during the transportation of wastes to a 
repository site. Table 3-4 illustrates the trust vs. perceived risk relationship 
with a rating scale measure of trust in DOE to "do the right thing with regard 
to a nuclear waste repository." In both tables, those who distrust DOE are 
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Figure 3-1 Responses of Nevada residents when asked to rate their trust in federal, state, 
and local officials and federal agencies to do what is right with regard to a nuclear waste 
repository at Yucca Mountain. 
Table 3-3 Relationship Between Trust in DOE and 
Perceived Risk of Transport Accidents 
Highway and Rail Accidents Will Occurb 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly 
DOE Can Be Trusted a Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
Strongly disagree 3.4 6.0 2.2 34.5 53.9 
Somewhat disagree 5.7 13.6 5.0 51.4 24.3 
Neutral 14.3 28.6 14.3 28.6 14.3 
Somewhat agree 2.6 22.1 7.8 49.4 18.2 
Strongly agree 25.0 25.0 10.7 14.3 25.0 
x 2 = 97.1, df = 16, p < .001. 
N 
230 
140 
7 
77 
28 
Note: Cell entries are row percentages based upon data from the Nevada survey. 
a The DOE can be trust�d to provide full and prompt disclosure of any accidents or serious problems 
with a repository program. 
b Highway and rail accidents will occur in transporting the wastes to the repository site. 
much more likely to agree that highway and rail accidents will occur than
are those who trust DOE. Table 3-5 illustrates the relationship between trust
in DOE to disclose problems and the respondent's response to the question
"Would you vat� for a repository at Yucca Mountain?" Among those who
disagree that DOE can be trusted to disclose accidents .or serious problems
with a repository program, about 85 to go percent would vote against a re-
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much more likely to agree that highway and rail accidents will occur than
are those who trust DOE. Table 3-5 illustrates the relationship between trust
in DOE to disclose problems and the respondent's response to the question
"Would you vat� for a repository at Yucca Mountain?" Among those who
disagree that DOE can be trusted to disclose accidents .or serious problems
with a repository program, about 85 to go percent would vote against a re-
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Table 3-4 Relationship Between Trust Rating of DOE and 
Perceived Risk of Transport Accidents 
Highway and Rail Accidents Will Occurb 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly 
Trust Rating• Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
0 5.7 5.7 1.4 31.4 55.7 
1-4 3.7 13.2 3.7 37.5 41.9 
5 5.1 9.3 6.8 44.9 33.9 
6-9 5.3 13.0 3.8 50.4 27.5 
10 17.2 24.1 10.3 17.2 31.0 
xz = 40.7, df = 16, p < .001. 
Note: Cell entries are row percentages based upon data from the Nevada survey. 
N 
70 
136 
118 
131 
29 
a Based upon rating trust in DOE to do what is right with regard to a nuclear waste repository (0 = no 
trust; 10 = complete trust). 
b Highway and rail accidents will occur in transporting the wastes to the repository site. 
Table 3-5 Relationship Between Trust in DOE and Response to the Question
"Would You Vote for a Repository at Yucca Mountain?" 
DOE Can Be Trusted to Disclose Any Problems 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat 
Yucca Mountain Vote Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Yes 8.3 14.4 33.3 34.9 
No 91.7 85.6 66.7 65.1 
N 204 118 6 63 
xz = 62.2, df = 4, p < .001. 
Strongly 
Agree 
66.7 
33.3 
21 
Note: Cell entries are column percentages. Responses are based upon the survey of Nevada residents. 
pository at Yucca Mountain. The percentage of votes against a repository
drops to 55, 1 percent for those who somewhat agree that DOE can be trusted
and falls further to 33.3 percent among the few who strongly agree that DOE
can be trusted. Other questions assessing trust, perceived risk, and opposi­
tion to a repository produced relationships similar to those in Tables 3-3,
3-4, and 3-5.
Imagery and Perception 
Prior to answering any of the attitude or opinion questions, respondents in
the national, southern California, and Nevada surveys, along with the 802
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respondents in Phoenix, were asked to free associate to the concept of a
nuclear waste repository. 
The potential for word associations to reveal the mental content of a per­
son's subjective experience was recognized by Plato and has a long history
in psychology, going back to Gal ton (1880), Wundt (1883), and Freud (1924).
More recently, Szalay and Deese (1978) have employed the method of con­
tinued associations to assess people's subjective representative systems for
a wide range of concepts. This method requires the subject to make repeated
associations to the same stimulus, for example, 
war: soldier 
war: fight 
war: killing 
war: etc. 
Szalay and Deese argue that the method of continued associations is an
efficient way to determine the contents and representational systems of
human minds without requiring those contents to be expressed in the full
discursive structure of language. In fact, we may reveal ourselves through
associations in ways we might find difficult to do if we were required to
spell out the full propositions behind these associations through answers to
questions. Evidence provided by Szalay and Deese and others demonstrates
that responses produced by the method of continued associations are not
erratic and whimsical but are stable and relate clearly and naturally to a
person's experiences and preferences. They are organized and structured in
much the same way as perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes. 
A related view is provided by Fiske, Pratto, and Pavelchak, who describe
an image as a "cognitive representation, a conception, or an idea, potentially
containing both concrete and abstract impressions; . . .  a mental picture, but
not necessarily visual" (1983:42). 
Cognitive images are often accompanied by affect and such affect-laden
images have been found to have important behavioral consequences. Preju­
dicial images give rise to discrimination (Hamilton, 1981). Images of politi­
cians affect voting behavior (Campbell et al., 1960). Images of nuclear war
affect an individual's level of antinuclear political activity (Fiske, Fratto,
and Pavelchak, 1983). Images of cities and states determine decisions about
places to vacation (Slavic et al., 1991) or attendance at conventions (Kun­
reuther and Easterling, 1990). 
The repository images were elicited using a version of the method of
continued associations adapted for a telephone interview. The elicitation
interview proceeded as follows: 
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Table 3-4 Relationship Between Trust Rating of DOE and 
Perceived Risk of Transport Accidents 
Highway and Rail Accidents Will Occurb 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly 
Trust Rating• Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
0 5.7 5.7 1.4 31.4 55.7 
1-4 3.7 13.2 3.7 37.5 41.9 
5 5.1 9.3 6.8 44.9 33.9 
6-9 5.3 13.0 3.8 50.4 27.5 
10 17.2 24.1 10.3 17.2 31.0 
xz = 40.7, df = 16, p < .001. 
Note: Cell entries are row percentages based upon data from the Nevada survey. 
N 
70 
136 
118 
131 
29 
a Based upon rating trust in DOE to do what is right with regard to a nuclear waste repository (0 = no 
trust; 10 = complete trust). 
b Highway and rail accidents will occur in transporting the wastes to the repository site. 
Table 3-5 Relationship Between Trust in DOE and Response to the Question
"Would You Vote for a Repository at Yucca Mountain?" 
DOE Can Be Trusted to Disclose Any Problems 
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat 
Yucca Mountain Vote Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Yes 8.3 14.4 33.3 34.9 
No 91.7 85.6 66.7 65.1 
N 204 118 6 63 
xz = 62.2, df = 4, p < .001. 
Strongly 
Agree 
66.7 
33.3 
21 
Note: Cell entries are column percentages. Responses are based upon the survey of Nevada residents. 
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The repository images were elicited using a version of the method of
continued associations adapted for a telephone interview. The elicitation
interview proceeded as follows: 
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My next question involves word association. For example, when I men­
tion the word 'baseball,' you might think of the World Series, Reggie
Jackson, summertime, or even hot dogs. Today I am interested in the
first six thoughts or images that come to mind when you think of an
underground nuclear waste repository. 3 Think about an underground
nuclear waste repository for a minute. When you think about this under­
ground nuclear waste repository, what is the first thought or image that
comes to mind? What is the next thought or image you have when I say
underground nuclear waste repository? 
Your next thought or image? 
This continued until six associations were produced or the respondent drew
a blank. 
The 3334 respondents in the four surveys produced a combined total of
exactly 10,000 word association images to the repository stimulus. The as­
sociations were examined and were classified according to their content to
13 general or superordinate categories, one of which was a miscellaneous
category. All but one superordinate category contained subordinate cate­
gories-in one case there were 17 subordinate categories that were judged
to fit the theme of the major category. All in all, there were 92 distinct
categories. Many of these contained multiple associations, judged to have
similar meanings. For example, the subcategory labeled Dangerous/Toxic,
within the superordinate category labeled Negative Consequences, included
the terms danger, dangerous, unsafe, disaster, hazardous, poisonous, and
so on. 
The 13 superordinate categories and their 92 subcategories contained 9439
word association images (94.4 percent of the total). Some 561 associations
were left uncategorized (5.6 percent of the total).
4 
Table 3-6 presents the 13 superordinate categories in order of their com­
bined frequencies across all four samples. The one exception to this ordering
is the relatively large miscellaneous category, which is presented last. The
subordinate categories are also shown, ordered by frequency within their
superordinate category. Table 3-7 presents an ordering of the subordinate
categories without regard for the superordinate structure.
The most arresting and most important finding is the extreme negative
quality of these images. The two dominant superordinate categories, Nega­
tive Consequences and Negative Concepts, accounted for more than 56 per­
cent of the total number of images. The dominant subordinate category,
Dangerous/Toxic, contained almost 17 percent of the total number of images.
The five largest subordinate categories, 
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Table 3-6 Images of a Nuclear Waste Repository: Totals for Four Surveys 
by Superordinate and Subordinate Categories 
Number 
of Images 
I. Negative Consequences d Nevada/Las Vegas 
a Dangerous/toxic 1683 e Waste/garbage/dumps 
b Death/ sickness 783 Isolated 
C Environmental damage 692 g Facilities and their 
d Leakage 216 construction 
e Destruction 133 h Bury it 
Pain and suffering 18 Locations-other 
g Uninhabitable 7 Total 
h Local repository area IV. Radiation, Physical States
consequences 6 a Radiation/nuclear
Negative b Chemicals and physical
consequences-other 8 states (liquids, gases) 
Total 3546 C Fire/hot 
II. Negative Concepts Total 
a Bad/negative 681 V. Safety, Security
b Scary 401 a Safety
C Unnecessary/ opposed 296 b Facilities security
d Not near me (NIMBY) 273 C Control, containment, 
e War/ annihilation 126 and cleanup 
Societally unpopular 41 d Caution 
g Crime and corruption 40 Total 
h Decay/ slime/ smell 39 VI. Concerns
Darkness/emptiness 37 a Problems
Negative toward b Questions
decisionmakers and C Health 
process 32 d Unsolvable 
k Commands to not build e Family 
or to eliminate them 24 Uncontrolled 
Wrong or bad solution 19 g Controversy 
m No nuclear, stop h Unpredictable 
producing 15 Mistakes 
n Unjust 14 j Serious 
0 Violence 10 k Skeptical 
p Prohibited 5 Concerns-other 
q Negative-other 15 Total --
Total 2068 VII. Societal Institutions
III. Locations a Government/industry
a Non-Nevada locations 245 b Military /weapons
b Storage location/ C Science, technology, 
containers 243 research, and progress 
C Desert/barren 237 d Political process 
Total 
Number 
of Images 
227 
215 
107 
66 
30 
20 
1390 
336 
55 
33 
424 
228 
44 
32 
27 
331 
119 
58 
25 
19 
18 
14 
13 
11 
8 
7 
5 
14 
311 
125 
106 
42 
31 
304 
72 The Context of Public Concern 
My next question involves word association. For example, when I men­
tion the word 'baseball,' you might think of the World Series, Reggie
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consequences-other 8 states (liquids, gases) 
Total 3546 C Fire/hot 
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a Bad/negative 681 V. Safety, Security
b Scary 401 a Safety
C Unnecessary/ opposed 296 b Facilities security
d Not near me (NIMBY) 273 C Control, containment, 
e War/ annihilation 126 and cleanup 
Societally unpopular 41 d Caution 
g Crime and corruption 40 Total 
h Decay/ slime/ smell 39 VI. Concerns
Darkness/emptiness 37 a Problems
Negative toward b Questions
decisionmakers and C Health 
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Total 
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215 
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Table 3-6 Continued Table 3-7 Subordinate Categories Ordered by Decreasing Frequency 
Number Number Number Number 
of Images of Images of Images of Images 
VIII. Ecology C Improved environment 9 I. a Dangerous/toxic 1683 XIII. c Transportation 38 
a Natural environment 124 d Feasible 3 I.b Death/sickness 783 II. i Darkness/emptiness 37 
b Food and water supply 25 e Positive-other 1 I. C Environmental damage 692 IV. C Fire/hot 33 
C Climate 9 Total 97 II. a Bad/negative 681 V. C Control, containment,
Total 158 XIII. Miscellaneous II. b Scary 401 and cleanup 32 
IX. Necessary a Future/long lasting 85 IV. a Radiation/nuclear 336 II. j Negative toward 
a Necessary 156 b Energy/power 65 II. c Unnecessary/ opposed 296 decisionmakers and 
Total 156 C Transportation 38 Il.d Not near me (NIMBY) 273 process 32 
X. Economics d Find alternatives 31 III. a Non-Nevada locations 245 VII. d Poli ti cal process 31 
a Cost 58 e Natural disasters III. b Storage location/ XIII. d Find alternatives 31 
b Employment 57 (potential or actual) 29 containers 243 III. h Bury it 30 
C Money/income 29 Population 22 III. C Desert/barren 237 XIII. e Natural disasters
d Economics-other 5 g Degree of distance 21 V. a Safety 228 (potential or actual) 29 
Total 149 h Neutral/apathetic/mixed III. d Nevada/Las Vegas 227 X. C Money /income 29 
XI. Information, Knowledge feelings 20 I. d Leakage 216 V. d Caution 27 
a Uninformed 57 Supervison/ III. e Waste/garbage/dumps 215 VI. C Health 25 
b Unsure/unknown 39 responsibility 14 IX. a Necessary 156 VIII. b Food and water supply 25 
C Curiosity, interest, and j Public figures 12 I.e Destruction 133 XII. b Effective 25 
knowledge 24 k Fiction 11 II. e War/annihilation 126 II.k Commands to not build
d Media 9 Problem avoidance 9 VII. a Government/industry 125 or to eliminate them 24 
e Information, m Inevitability 8 VIII. a Natural environment 124 XI. c Curiosity, interest, and 
know ledge-other 2 n Faith 5 VI. a Problems 119 knowledge 24 
Total 131 0 O.K.If ... 4 III. f Isolated 107 XIII. f Population 22 
XII. Positive Total 374 VII. b Military /weapons 106 XIII. g Degree of distance 21 
a Positive, unconcerned 59 XIV. Uncategorized 561 XIII.a Future/long lasting 85 III. i Locations-other 20 
b Effective 25 TOT AL NUMBER OF ITEMS 10,000 III. g Facilities and their XIII. h Neutral/apathetic/
construction 66 mixed feelings 20 
XIII. b Energy/power 65 VI. d Unsolvable 19 
XII. a Positive, unconcerned 59 II. I Wrong or bad solution 19 
la. Dangerous/Toxic 16.83 % VI. b Questions 58 VI. e Family 18 
lb. Death/Sickness 7.83 % X. a Cost 58 I.f Pain and suffering 18 
le. Environmental Damage 6.92 % XI. a Uninformed 57 Il.q Negative-other 15 
X. b Employment 57 II. m Nuclear, stop producing 15 
Ila. Bad/Negative 6.81 % IV. b Chemicals and physical VI.f Uncontrolled 14 
IIb. Scary 4.01 % states (liquids, gases) 55 II.n Unjust 14 
V.b Facilities security 44 XIII. i Supervision/ 
were thoroughly negative in affective quality and accounted for more than VII. C Science, technology, responsibility 14 
42 percent of the total number of images. The four most frequent single as- research, and progress 42 VI. I Concerns-other 14 
sociations were dangerous (n = 539), danger (n = 37 8), death (n = 306), and II.f Societally unpopular 41 VI. g Controversy 13 
II. g Crime and corruption 40 XIII. j Public figures 12 
pollution (n = 276). II.h Decay/ slime/ smell 39 XIII. k Fiction 11 
Positive imagery was rare. Category XII, Positive, accounted for only 1 XI. b Unsure/unknown 39 VI. h Unpredictable 11 
percent of the images. Other generally positive concepts, Necessary (cate-
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Positive imagery was rare. Category XII, Positive, accounted for only 1 XI. b Unsure/unknown 39 VI. h Unpredictable 11 
percent of the images. Other generally positive concepts, Necessary (cate-
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Table 3-7 Continued 
Number 
of Images 
II. o Violence 10 
XII. c Improved environment 9 
XI. d Media 9 
VIII. C Climate 9 
XIII. 1 Problem avoidance 9 
I. i Negative consequences-
other 8 
XIII. m Inevitability 8 
VI. i Mistakes 8 
VI. j Serious 7 
I. g Uninhabitable 7 
I. h
X. d
II. P
XIII. n
VI. k
XIII. o
XII.cl
XI. e 
XII. e
Note: Roman numerals indicate superordinate categories. 
Number 
of Images 
Local repository area 
consequences 6 
Economics-other 5 
Prohibited 5 
Faith 5 
Skeptical 5 
O.K.If ... 4 
Feasible 3 
Information, 
kriow ledge-other 2 
Positive-other 1 
gory IX), Employment (category Xb), and Money/Income (category Xe) com­
bined to total only 2.5 percent of the images. The response safe was given 
only 37 times (0.37 percent). 
Other noteworthy features of the combined data are: 
-There were 232 associations pertaining to war, annihilation, weapons,
and things military (categories Ile and VIIb).
-There were 85 associations relating to the long duration of storage
necessary for nuclear wastes or the transfer of risk and responsibilities
to future generations (XIIIa).
-There were surprisingly few (38) transportation images (XIIIc).
-The famous NIMBY position ("not in my backyard") was expressed in
273 images (category lid).
-Nuclear waste repositories are sometimes referred to derisively as
"dumps." Although dump imagery was definitely present, it was infre­
quent (40 associations).
-Studies of risk perception have found that the risks of nuclear reactors
and nuclear wastes have a dread quality. There were definite signs of
this in the images. Although the word dread was never mentioned spe­
cifically, many of the responses categorized as Scary (lib) reflected this
quality (e.g., fear, horror, apprehension, terror).
-Lack of trust in DOE or other governmental agents is a common finding
in studies of public perceptions of nuclear waste management. Asso­
ciations indicative of distrust appeared in category Ilj, Negative Toward
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Decisionmakers and Process, and categories Ill and Vii, dealing with 
mistakes. A number of images in the Bad/Negative category also seemed 
to reflect lack of trust (e.g., stupid, dumb, illogical). 
-Jones et al. (1984) have attempted to characterize the key dimen­
sions of stigma. Two of their major defining characteristics of stigma
are peril and negative aesthetic qualities (ugliness, repulsion). These
qualities dominate the repository images. Peril is pervasive through­
out categories I and II and elsewhere, and negative aesthetics form the
bulk of the subordinate categories Bad/Negative (Ila) and Decay, Slime,
Smell (Ilh).
The image frequencies were very similar from one survey to another. 
Demographic differences were also small. The negativity of repository 
images was remarkably consistent across men and women of different ages, 
incomes, education levels, and political persuasions. 
After free-associating to the repository stimulus, each respondent rated 
the affective quality of his or her associations on a five-point scale ranging 
from extremely negative to extremely positive. These affective ratings were 
highly correlated with the respondent's attitudes and perceptions of risk. 
For example, Table 3-8 shows a strong relationship between a person's rating 
of the first image they produced and their response to the question "Would 
you vote for a repository at Yucca Mountain?" More than go percent of the 
persons whose first image was judged very negative voted against a reposi­
tory at Yucca Mountain; more than half of the persons whose first image was
judged positive voted in fav,or of the repository. A similarly strong relation­
ship was found between affective ratings of images and a person's judgment
of the likelihood of accidents or other problems at a repository. Negativity of 
Table 3-8 Relationship Between Affective Rating of a Person's First Image of a Nuclear
Waste Repository and Their Response to the Question "Would You Vote for a Repository
at Yucca Mountain?" 
Yucca Mountain Vote 
Yes 
No 
N 
x 2 = Bl.4, df = 4, p < .001. 
Very 
Negative 
8.9 
91.1 
305 
Evaluation of the First Image 
Somewhat Somewhat 
Negative Neutral Positive 
17.6 38.9 54.2 
82.4 61.1 45.8 
34 18 24 
Very 
Positive 
60.7 
39.3 
28 
Note: Cell entries are column percentages. Responses based on a survey of Nevada residents. 
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Table 3-8 Relationship Between Affective Rating of a Person's First Image of a Nuclear
Waste Repository and Their Response to the Question "Would You Vote for a Repository
at Yucca Mountain?" 
Yucca Mountain Vote 
Yes 
No 
N 
x 2 = Bl.4, df = 4, p < .001. 
Very 
Negative 
8.9 
91.1 
305 
Evaluation of the First Image 
Somewhat Somewhat 
Negative Neutral Positive 
17.6 38.9 54.2 
82.4 61.1 45.8 
34 18 24 
Very 
Positive 
60.7 
39.3 
28 
Note: Cell entries are column percentages. Responses based on a survey of Nevada residents. 
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the image rating was also strongly related to support for the state of Nevada's 
opposition to the repository program. 
What was learned by asking more than 3300 people to associate freely 
to the concept of a nuclear waste repository? The most obvious answer 
is that people don't like nuclear waste. However, these images (as well as 
the responses to the attitude and opinion questions) demonstrate an aver­
sion so strong that to call it "negative" or a "dislike" hardly does it justice. 
What these responses reveal are pervasive qualities of dread, revulsion, and 
anger-the raw materials of stigmatization and political opposition. 
Because nuclear waste is a by-product of an impressive technology 
capable of producing massive amounts of energy without contributing to 
greenhouse gases, one might expect to find associations to energy and its 
benefits-electricity, light, heat, employment, health, progress, the good 
life-scattered among the images. Almost none were observed. 
Moreover, people were not asked to reflect on nuclear waste; instead, they 
were asked about a storage facility (Phoenix survey) or a repository (other 
surveys). One might expect, following the predominant view of experts in 
this field, to find a substantial number of repository images reflecting the 
qualities necessary and safe (see Table 3-1). Few images of this kind were 
observed. 
It appears that the repository has acquired the imagery of nuclear waste, 
through some process of transference-guilt by association. The transfer­
ence is so natural, so powerful, that one state official involved in nuclear 
safety, upon hearing of these imagery results, indignantly accused us of 
having biased our respondents by calling the facility a "nuclear waste re­
pository." 
Evidence that the quality of repository imagery has not heretofore been 
appreciated comes from exhortations by nuclear power proponents not to 
use the term dump when referring to the repository, because of the obvious 
negative connotations or imagery this word conveys (Carter, 1987). Not only 
is dump or garbage imagery relatively infrequent in the observed responses, 
such images would appear rather benign in comparison to the more preva­
lent responses. 
How Did It Get This Way? 
Imagery and attitudes so negative and so impervious to influence from the 
assessments of technical experts must have very potent origins. Weart's 
scholarly analysis of images shows that nuclear fears are deeply rooted in 
our social and cultural consciousness. He argues persuasively that mod-
Perceived Risk, Trust, and Nuclear Waste 79 
em thinking about nuclear energy employs beliefs and symbols that have 
been associated for centuries with the concept of transmutation-the pas­
sage through destruction to rebirth. In the early decades of the twentieth 
century, transmutation images became centered on radioactivity, which was 
associated with "uncanny rays that brought hideous death or miraculous 
new life; with mad scientists and their ambiguous monsters; with cosmic 
secrets of death and life; ... and with weapons great enough to destroy the 
world .... " (Weart, 1988:421). 
But this concept of transmutation has a duality that is hardly evident in 
the imagery we observed. Why has the destructive aspect predominated? 
The answer likely involves the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which 
linked the frightening images to reality. The sprouting of nuclear energy in 
the aftermath of the atomic bombing has led Smith to observe: "Nuclear 
energy was conceived in secrecy, born in war, and first revealed to the world 
in horror. No matter how much proponents try to separate the peaceful from 
the weapons atom, the connection is firmly embedded in the minds of the 
public" (1988:62). 
Research supports Smith's assertions. A study by Slovic, Lichtenstein, and 
Fischhoff (1979) found that, even before the accident at Three Mile Island 
(TMI), people expected nuclear-reactor accidents to lead to disasters of im­
mense proportions. When asked to describe the consequences of a "typical 
reactor accident," people's scenarios were found to resemble scenarios of 
the aftermath of nuclear war. Replication of these studies after the TMI event 
found even more extreme "images of disaster." 5 
Fiske, Pratto, and Pavelchak (1983) studied public images of nuclear war 
and obtained results that were similar to our repository images. The domi­
nant themes of nuclear war were physical destruction (long-term, short-term, 
and immediate), death, injury, weapons, politics, hell, oblivion, nothing­
ness, pain, contamination, radiation, end of civilization, and genetic dam­
age. Dominant emotional images included fear, terror, worry, and sadness, 
with anger, hate, helplessness, and peace mentioned somewhat less fre­
quently. 
The shared imagery of nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and nuclear waste 
may explain some of the surprising results that have come from surveys that 
have examined perceived risks for these various forms of nuclear hazards. A 
nuclear waste repository is judged to pose risks at least as great as a nuclear 
power plant or a nuclear weapons test site (Kunreuther, Desvousges, and 
Slovic, 1988). If asked to indicate the closest distance a facility could be 
built from one's home before one would want to move to another place or 
actively protest, people are far more averse to living neat a nuclear waste 
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repository than any other kind of facility studied, including a nuclear power
plant, a chemical-waste landfill, or a pesticide-manufacturing facility (Flynn
et al., 1990). 
Further insights into the special quality of nuclear fear are provided by
Erikson (1990), who draws attention to the broad, emerging theme of tox­
icity, both radioactive and chemical, that characterizes a "whole new species 
of trouble" associated with modern technological disasters. Erikson de­
scribes the exceptionally dread quality of technological accidents that ex­
pose people to radiation and chemicals in ways that "contaminate rather
than merely damage; ...  pollute, befoul, and taint rather than just create
wreckage; . . .  penetrate human tissue indirectly rather than wound the
surface by assaults of a more straightforward kind" (1990:120). Unlike natu­
ral disasters, these accidents are unbounded. Unlike conventional disaster
plots, they have no end. "Invisible contaminants remain a part of the sur­
roundings-absorbed into the grain of the landscape, the tissues of the body
and, worst of all, into the genetic material of the survivors. An 'all clear' is 
never sounded. The book of accounts is never closed" (1990:121).
Another strong determiner of public perceptions is the continuing story
of decades of mishandling of wastes at the nation's military weapons facili­
ties operated by DOE (National Academy of Sciences, 1989). Leakage from
these facilities has resulted in widespread contamination of the environ­
ment, projected to require more than $150 billion for cleanup over the next
thirty years. The recent revelation of unprecedented releases of radiation 
from the Hanford, Washington, weapons plant in the 1940s and 1950s (Mar­
shall, 1990) will certainly compound the negative imagery associated with a
nuclear waste repository and further undermine public trust in government
management of nuclear waste disposal. 
A Crisis of Confidence 
Analysis of these survey data provides insight into the remarkably negative
attitudes toward radioactive waste disposal facilities and the impassioned
opposition to government efforts to site high-level and low-level waste re­
positories. The negativity of perceptions and emotions associated with a
repository are remarkable in light of the confidence that most technical ana­
lysts and engineers have in their ability to dispose of radioactive materials 
safely. Even the report of the National Research Council, though highly con­
cerned about the difficulties of predicting the long-term performance of a
repository, conceded that "these uncertainties do not necessarily mean that
the risks are significant, nor that the public should reject efforts to site the
repository" (1990:13). 
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Chauncey Starr, pointing to the public's lack of concern about the risks 
from tigers in urban zoos, has argued that "acceptance of any risk is more
dependent on public confidence in risk management than on the quantita­
tive estimates of risk .... " (1985:98). Public fears and opposition to nuclear
waste disposal plans can be seen as a "crisis of confidence," a profound
breakdown of trust in the scientific, governmental, and industrial managers 
of nuclear technologies. 
Viewing the nuclear waste problem as one of distrust in risk manage­
ment gives additional insight into its difficulty. Social psychological studies 
(Rothbart and Park, 1986) have validated "folk wisdom" by demonstrating
that trust is a quality that is quickly lost and slowly regained.6 A single act
of embezzlement is enough to convince us that our accountant is untrust­
worthy. A subsequent opportunity to embezzle that is not taken does little to 
reduce the degree of distrust. Indeed, a hundred subsequent honest actions
would probably do little to restore our trust in this individual.
In this light, the 1989 attempt by DOE to regain the confidence of the public,
t�e Congress, and the nuclear industry by simply rearranging its organiza­
tional chart and promising to do a better job of management and science
in the future (Moore, 1989) appears naive. Trust, once lost, cannot be so
easily restored. Similarly naive is the aim professed by DOE officials and
other nuclear industry leaders to change public perception and gain sup­
port by letting people see firsthand the safety of nuclear waste management.
The nature of any low-probability, high-consequence threat is such that ad­
verse events will demonstrate riskiness, but demonstrations of safety (or
negligible risk) will require a very long time, free of damaging incidents.
The intense scrutiny given to nuclear power and nuclear waste issues by
the news media (Mazur, 1990) insures that a stream of problems, occur­
ring all over the world, will be brought to the public's attention, continually
eroding trust. 
Where Next for Nuclear Waste Disposal?
Although everyone appreciates the sophisticated engineering required to
stor� nuclear wastes safely, the political requirements necessary to design 
and implement a repository have not similarly been appreciated. As a result,
notes Jacob, "while vast resources have been expended on developing com­
plex and sophisticated technologies, the equally sophisticated political pro­
cesses and institutions required to develop a credible and legitimate strategy
for nuclear waste management have not been developed" (1990:164).
. 
In the absence of a trustworthy process for siting, developing, and operat­
mg a nuclear waste repository, the prospects for a short-term solution to the
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disposal problem seem remote. The report of the National Research Council 
(1990) is quite sensitive to issues of risk perception and trust but makes the 
strong assumption that trust can be restored by a process that openly recog­
nizes the limits of technical understanding and does not aim to "get it right 
the first time." It seems likely that such open admission of uncertainty and 
refusal to guarantee safety might well have opposite effects from those in­
tended-increased concern and further deterioration of trust. Moreover, the 
NRC statement also assumes that DOE will continue to manage the nuclear 
waste program, thus failing to come to grips with the difficulties that DOE 
will face in restoring its tainted image. 
The lack of a trustworthy process for siting, developing, and operating a 
nuclear waste repository has drawn a number of other comments and rec­
ommendations besides those of the NRG. Weinberg (1989) drew an analogy 
between fear of witches during the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries 
and today's fear of harm from radiation. He hypothesized that "rad-waste 
phobia" may dissipate if the intelligentsia (read "environmentalists") say 
that such fears are unfounded, much as eventually happened with fears of 
witches. Carter argued that "trust will be gained by building a record of 
sure, competent, open performance that gets good marks from independent 
technical peer reviewers and that shows decent respect for the public's sen­
sibilities and common sense" (1987:416). He also recommended that the 
National Academy of Sciences undertake a study to determine how an inde­
pendent and credible process of peer review could be established to increase 
public trust in repository siting and development and to determine how 
state and local governments can best be given a voice in siting investiga­
tions and in oversight of actual repository operations. Others have called 
for more radical changes, such as creating new organizations and develop­
ing procedures to ensure that state, local, and tribal governments have a 
much stronger voice in siting decisions and oversight of actual repository 
operations ( e.g., Advisory Panel, 1984; Bella, Mosher, and Calvo, 1988; Bord, 
1987; Creighton, 1990; Jacob, 1990 ). In this spirit, an official of the Canadian 
government has argued for making repository siting in that country volun­
tary by requiring public consent as an absolute prerequisite for confirming 
any decision (Frech, 1991). 
Whatever steps are taken, it is unlikely that the current "crisis in confi­
dence" will be ended quickly or easily. We must settle in for a long effort 
to restore the public trust. Krauskopf ( 1990) has noted that postponing the 
repository to an indefinite future can be defended on a variety of technical 
grounds, and points out that the choice between repository construction or 
postponement ultimately rests upon the shoulders of the public and their 
elected representatives. The problems of perception and trust described 
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above imply that postponement of a permanent repository may be the only 
politically viable option in the foreseeable future. 
In an address to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commis­
sioners in November 1990, Joseph Rhodes, Jr., himself a commissioner from 
Pennsylvania, pointed out the implications of the polls indicating that most 
Nevadans oppose the siting of a repository anywhere in Nevada and want 
state leaders to oppose such siting with any means available (Rhodes, 1990).
"I can't imagine," said Rhodes, "that there will ever be a usable Yucca Moun­
tain repository if the people of Nevada don't want it . . . .  There are just too 
many ways to delay the program .... " (1990:6).7 
What are the options in the light of dedicated public opposition to a per-
manent underground repository? Rhodes lists and rejects several: 
-Continuing on the present path in an attempt to site a permanent re­
pository (which Rhodes refers to as the modern equivalent of "pyramids
underground") is a costly and doomed effort.
-Permanent on-site storage is unsafe.
-Deploying a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) program is also po-
litically unacceptable. Without a viable program to develop a permanent
repository, the MRS would be seen, in effect, as the permanent site.
-Reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel is also politically unacceptable
because of concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation. Moreover, re­
processing reduces but does not eliminate high-level wastes, and the
record of managing reprocessing residues at Hanford and other military
sites is hardly encouraging.
Rhodes concludes that the only viable option is to delay the siting of a 
permanent repository for several decades and store the wastes on site in 
the interim-employing dry-cask storage that has been certified by NRC as 
being as safe as geological storage for 100 or more years (Nuclear Regula­
tory Commission, 1990). Technical knowledge would undoubtedly advance 
greatly during this interim period. Perceptions of risk and trust in govern­
ment and industry might change greatly, too, if the problem of establishing 
and maintaining trust is taken seriously. 
Beyond Yucca Mountain 
The story of Yucca Mountain has implications for environmental decision­
making that transcend the conflicts and concerns surrounding the disposal 
of radioactive wastes. People's perceptions of chemicals are almost as nega­
tive as their perceptions of radioactivity. Any major facility that produces, 
uses, transports, or disposes of chemicals will face similar problems origi-
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ment and industry might change greatly, too, if the problem of establishing 
and maintaining trust is taken seriously. 
Beyond Yucca Mountain 
The story of Yucca Mountain has implications for environmental decision­
making that transcend the conflicts and concerns surrounding the disposal 
of radioactive wastes. People's perceptions of chemicals are almost as nega­
tive as their perceptions of radioactivity. Any major facility that produces, 
uses, transports, or disposes of chemicals will face similar problems origi-
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nating from perceptions of risk that bear little resemblance to the risk as­
sessments of technical experts. No one is happy about the current state of 
affairs. Industrialists, scientists, politicians, and the public are united only 
in their anger and frustration about the ways that environmental risks are 
currently managed. 
Restoration and preservation of trust in risk management needs to be 
given top priority. A solution to the problem of trust is not immediately 
apparent. The problem is not due to public ignorance or irrationality but is 
deeply rooted in the adversarial nature of our social, institutional, legal, and 
political systems of risk management. Public relations won't create trust. 
Aggressive and competent government regulation, coupled with increased 
public involvement, oversight, and local control over decisionmaking might. 
Notes 
This chapter relies extensively on material from the authors' article by the same title 
published in Environment, 33, no. 3 (April, 1991): 6-11, 28-30, reprinted by permission 
from Heldref Publications. It also draws on material from P. Slavic, J. Flynn, and M. Lay­
man, "Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste," published in Science, 254 
(December 13, 1991): 1603-7. 
1 The Nevada results reported in this section are based upon the 500 respondents in the 
statewide survey. 
2 The 1991 survey was conducted in the days following the conclusion of the Gulf War 
when President Bush's approval ratings had reached unprecedented levels. 
3 Respondents in the Phoenix survey were asked to associate to the term underground 
nuclear waste storage facility. 
4 A complete listing of all 10,000 images, including those that were not categorized, is 
available from the authors. 
5 The fact that the earliest technical risk assessments for nuclear power plants portrayed 
"worst-case scenarios" of tens of thousands of deaths and devastation over geographic 
areas the size of Pennsylvania likely contributed to such extreme images (see Ford, 
1977). These early projections received enormous publicity, as in the movie The China 
Syndrome. 
6 Abraham Lincoln, in a letter to Alexander McClure, observed: "If you once forfeit the 
confidence of your fellow citizens, you can never regain their respect and esteem." 
7 Rhodes's assertion echoes an earlier statement made by a former DOE official, John 
O'Leary, in an interview with Luther Carter: "'When you think of all the things a de­
termined state can do, it's no contest,' O'Leary told me, citing by way of example the 
regulatory authority a state has with respect to its lands, highways, employment codes, 
and the like. The federal courts, he added, would strike down each of the state's block­
ing actions, but meanwhile years would roll by and, in a practical sense, DOE's cause 
would be lost" (Carter, 1987: 185). 
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